On the 1st July 1916 at 7.30am the British Army launched their great offensive over the Somme river valley. The attack had been months in the planning, the intention was to punch a hole trough the German lines on the high ground of the Thiepval – Pozieres - Ginchy Ridge and press in through to envelope the German line.
The Somme had traditionally been a quite sector and therefore the Germans had prepared very strong defences, the Dug-outs were in some places 30 feet deep. The British Army were well aware of the extent of the task that faced them, raiding parties had captured a number of prisoners who had told them that deep dugouts offered the German soldiers very good protection from any bombardment. This did not fill the General in charge of the attack General Rawlinson with over confidence, in fact he had his own misgivings about the offensive, but once it had been agreed there was unfortunately no going back.
The German defense had two extensive and full lines of defense and a third in the making. The first ran through the villages of Serre, Theipval, La Boisselle and Fricourt and was a well organized system of battle and communication trenches. The second line, was a mile or two to the rear of the first and deeply cut into the chalk ridge that ran through the region. It meant in reality that an offensive had to be two-part, one breaking the first line and the second overcoming the deep defenses on the ridge.
The ‘Volunteer’ new 4th Army under General Rawlinson had been given the task of breaking the German defences. The Fourth Army comprised over half a million men but although there were a number of regular divisions lined up alongside Kitchener battalions, the Army as a whole lacked battle experience. Sixty per cent of the battalions were comprised of New Army men and even the regular divisions no longer comprised purely career soldiers. The steady drain caused by casualties sustained over the previous 22 months and the exchange of battalions with New Army Divisions had changed the character of the regular divisions.
In March of 1916, General Rawlinson with his staff had first developed a plan that he called ‘bite and hold’. Rawlinson with mathematical reckoning thought that the army should be able to gain the German front line over a length of 20,000 yards and then in the second separate attack press on and overrun the second line. To aid them in achieving this, the British Army amassed 400 heavy and 1,000 field guns over 20 miles and for the seven days preceding they attack bombarded the German lines constantly day and night in the hope of smashing the German defences and destroying the defensive wire.
Winston Churchill in his book “The World in Crisis" explains it thus:
“The plan of the British and French was admittedly to pierce the whole German trench system on a front of many kilometers, and then by wheeling outwards-the British to the north-east and north and the French to the south-east-to roll up from the flanks the exposed portions of the German line; and British and French cavalry divisions were held ready to be pushed forward through the gap so made. The French objective was to gain the rising ground east of the Somme south of Peronne, while 'the corresponding British objective' was' the semicircle of high ground running from the neighbourhood of Le Transloy through Bapaume to Achiet-IeGrand."…….
"The whole effectiveness of the plan depended on the speed of its execution. If for instance an interval of two or three days intervened between the penetration and the outward wheel the enemy's line would be switched back on both sides of the gap and a whole new web of fortifications would obstruct a further advance. All prospect of a great rupture followed by rolling up the flanks was dependent upon a rate of progress so rapid as to preclude the construction and organization by the enemy of fresh defensive lines. If the Joftre-Haig plan was to achieve any success apart from mere attrition, progress must be continuous and rapid, and the objectives specified must be attained at the latest in two or three days. If this were not secured, the great attack would have failed. Other attacks might subsequently be planned and might be locally successful, but the scheme of a grand rupture was definitely at an end. "
With the plan agreed, on 24th June 1916 the bombardment started and it unleashed a hell on earth. Some Germans and even the rats went mad and ran away. For seven days it pounded the German front line and it seemed to the British soldiers of the time that nothing could survive it. But the Germans did survive it and it failed in a majority of sections to cut the wire. At 7.30am on the 1st July 1916 the British Army rose from their trenches and commenced the attack, when the evening came they had lost 57, 470 officers and men, 19,240 of them killed and 2,152 missing.
In the south, the XV Corps under Henry Horne had taken Mametz and nearly made Fricourt. The XIII Corps had also taken all its objectives. But in the North of the attack the III Corps, X Corps and VII Corps had made only a few real gains.
Winston Churchill again describes it :
"At seven thirty o'clock in the morning of July 1 the British and French, armies rose from their trenches steel-helmeted, gas-masked, equipped with all the latest apparatus of war, bombs, mortars, machine-guns light and heavy, and, supported by all their artillery, marched against the enemy on a front of 45 kilometers. Fourteen British divisions and five French divisions were almost immediately engaged. South of the Somme on the French front the Germans were taken completely by surprise. They had not believed the French capable after their punishment at Verdun of any serious offensive effort. They expected at the most only demonstrations. They were not ready for the French, and the French attack, though unfortunately on a needlessly small scale, captured and overwhelmed the German troops throughout the whole of their first system of trenches.
Very different were the fortunes of the British. Everywhere they found the enemy fully prepared. The seven days' bombardment had by no means accomplished what had been expected. Safely hidden in the deep dugouts, the defenders and their machine guns were practically intact. From these they emerged with deadly effect at the moment of assault or even after the waves of attack had actually passed over and beyond them. Though the German front line was crossed at every point, the great advance into his position failed except on the right. The three British divisions on that flank captured Montauban and Mametz and an area 4 1/2 miles wide by 1 1/2 miles deep, thus isolating Fricourt on the south. The 21st Division north of this village also made progress and gained nearly a mile. But though the defenders of Fricourt were thus almost cut off, the attempt to storm the village failed. Northwards again the two divisions of the Third Corps, though they advanced a thousand yards, failed in spite of repeated efforts to capture La Boiselle or Ovillers on the long spurs of the Pozieres plateau. By nightfall the gain in this part of the field comprised only two pockets or bulges in the enemy's position. The attack of the X Corps with three divisions broke down before the immense defences of the Thiepval spur and plateau. Although two of its great supporting points, the Leipzig and Schwaben redoubts, were captured, all attacks on Thiepval failed, and the failure to take Thiepval entailed the evacuation of the Schwaben. Opposite Beaumont-Hamel, on the extreme left, the VIII Corps, after reaching the German front line, was driven back to its own. trenches. The subsidiary attack made by the Third Army against Gommecourt completely failed, practically no damage to the German defences having been done in the long bombardment.”
The reports that got back to General Rawlinson were inaccurate, he misunderstanding of the disaster that had befallen the Army pressed on with the next phase. The next day July 2nd, they attempted to in vain to take Ovillers, less than 1 mile from the original front.
Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig in his dairy entry for July 2nd, gives us glimpse at the thinking that was at G.H.Q at the time:
“A days of downs and ups! As regards weather, the day was fine, bright sun and cool wind, but the barometer registered a fall during the night.
I also visited two Casualty Clearing Stations at Montigny, one under Major Thomas, the other under Colonel Macpherson. They were very pleased at my visit. The wounded were in wonderful spirits. I saw Sir Wilmot Herringham with his coat off, setting a fine example, by washing and attending to the slightly wounded cases…..
The A.G. reported today that the total casualties are estimated at over 40,000 to date. This cannot be considered severe in view of the numbers engaged, and the length of front attacked. By nightfall, the situation is much more favourable than when we started today.”
On July 6-7 the British took La Boiselle and Contalmaision, but the Germans regained it only a few hours later. The same day an attack by the British on Mametz Wood was repulsed, the wood would eventually be taken a week later. In fact after ten days hard fighting on average the Germans had only been pushed back a few kilometers.
On July 13th the British broke through the German lines along the Longueval Ridge at Bazentin-le-Petit in a daring night attack. The sector was 3.5 miles wide and real hope of a breakthrough was hoped for but this soon disappeared. July 15th saw the Army reach High Wood but they were unable to capture it. Just along the road south the battle for Deville Wood commenced the same day. But a day earlier, July 14th the British army made its first attempt to take the small village of Pozieres.
Despite the failure to achieve a real sustained breakthrough the feeling with the public and soldiers was still one of optimism. C.E.W Bean in the “A.I.F. in France” explains that gains were made but little knowledge of the cost was known:
“To the average British soldier, as well as to the people at home, the reports of the Somme battle appeared almost wholly favorable. It is true that the great results announced on July 1st and 14th had in each case been followed only by more heavy fighting. But the public and even the army – except the divisions which had taken part on July 1st – had little conception of the cost, or of how far the results fell short of the intentions. Two great blows had undoubtedly been struck; the British for the first time were making headway through a firmly established enemy position; the lines which most of the troops had believed impregnable were being slowly penetrated. This was a valuable achievement, but, to the army and people who yearned so long for success, the intermittent advances on the Somme often signified far more than they were worth; and, as the communiqués of G.H.Q (prepared for enemy consumption) were rose-coloured and unfavourable comment was suppressed by the then censors, the average citizen or soldier entertained few misgivings.”
It was with this feeling of optimism that the 1st Australian Division encamped to the south-west of the battlefield prepared to enter the fight.
More Information:
For an excellent detailed overview of the Somme offensive, go to the Long, Long Trail.
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